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NOTES
illustrates the need for resorting to legislative history to deter-
mine what is meant by coercion in Section 8 (b) (1) (A).
If either organizational or recognition picketing is effective,
it will result in a loss of business to the employer. When this
occurs, employees are confronted with the possibility of loss of
their jobs or reduction in pay if the employer cannot withstand
the economic loss. The only other alternative is for the em-
ployees to join the union. Thus the conflict here is between three
parties: the employees who do not want to join the union; the
employer who wants to avoid the increased labor costs and other
problems that accompany unionization; and the union which is
seeking to improve wages and working conditions of its members
by strengthening bargaining power and eliminating non-union
shops. It is clear that all three parties are seeking legitimate
ends. Congress, in the National Labor Relations Act, has set out
the rules under which the economic struggle is to be waged.
Section 8(b) (1) (A) prohibits the union's use of force, violence,
or threats of economic reprisal. It was not intended to deny the
union its right to picket the employer premises, urging those
sympathetic to the union cause to support the union. If the union
is to be deprived of this weapon, the decision should be made by
Congress. 22
Sidney D. Fazio
MILITARY LAW - USE OF MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL BY
COURT-MARTIAL MEMBERS DISALLOWED
The defendant pleaded guilty to and was convicted of several
charges under the Uniform Code of Military Justice by a general
court-martial.' Thereafter the law officer 2 fully advised the
22. See Cox, Collective Bargaining and Industrial Practices, 35 L.R.R.M. 56
(1954) wherein the author takes the position that neither picketing for recognition
nor organizational picketing should be permitted after the employees have signified
in an election whether in truth the union is their organization. However, he ap-
parently feels that the present act does not cover the problem and recommends
that Section 8(b) (4) (C) be amended to cover it.
1. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 16, c. 1041, 70A STAT. 42 (1956),
10 U.S.C. § 816 (Supp. V 1958) : "The three kinds of courts-martial in each of
the armed forces are- (1) general courts-martial, consisting of a law officer and
not less than five members; (2) special courts-martial, consisting of not less
than three members; and (3) summary courts-martial, consisting of one commis-
sioned officer."
Any officer on active duty may serve on a court-martial. Enlisted personnel
are also eligible to serve on a court-martial if the accused requests their appoint-
ment to the court. See UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 25, c. 1041, 70A
STAT. 45 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 825 (Supp. V 1958).
2. The law officer is peculiar to the general court-martial. "The authority con-
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court of the authorized maximum sentence and the members of
the court-martial, each with a copy of the Manual for Courts-
Martial at his disposal, retired to deliberate on the sentence.
The court later reopened and requested instructions from the law
officer on sections of the Manual to which he had not referred
them. He refused to give the instructions, considering the sec-
tions immaterial in arriving at an appropriate sentence.8 Sub-
sequently the court arrived at a sentence that the defendant be
dismissed from the service and pay a fine of $500. On review by
the United States Court of Military Appeals, held, reversed on
other grounds 4 and remanded to the convening authority for re-
hearing by another court-martial on the sentence. By rule the
court stated that in the future the members of neither a general
nor a special court-martial could refer to the Manual during the
course of the trial or while deliberating on the findings or the
vening a general court-martial shall detail as law officer thereof a commissioned
officer who is a member of the bar of a Federal court or of the highest court of a
State and who is certified to be qualified for such duty by the Judge Advocate
General of the armed force of which he is a member." UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE art. 26(a), c. 1041, 70A STAT. 46 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 826 (Supp. V
1958).
It is the duty of the law officer to direct the trial along the paths of recog-
nized procedure in such a manner as to bring the hearing to an end without preju-
dice to either party. Therefore he can make "restrained" comments upon the evi-
dence in order to avoid entangling the proceedings with unnecessary and immaterial
issues. He must maintain an impartial attitude, while at the same time exercising
control over the proceedings. United States v. Jackson, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 646, 14
C.M.R. 64 (1954).
The president of the special court-martial performs duties analogous to those
of the law officer. However, he is a member of the court-martial, and seldom is
legally trained. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, par. 40(a)
(1951), provides that "the senior in rank among the members appointed to a ...
special court-martial is the president; however, the senior member present at a
trial, whether or not he is the senior member appointed to the court, is president
of the court for the trial of that case." It is his duty to check the votes of the
members and announce the result of the ballot, rule upon interlocutory questions
other than challenges, and instruct the court as to the elements of each offense
charged and the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt and burden of proof.
Id. at par. 40(b) (2). See United States v. Pulliam, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 95, 11 C.M.R.
95 (1953).
3. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, par. 76(a)(4) (1951)
provides that the members of the court-martial may consider penalties adjudged in
other cases for similar offenses. (The law officer ruled that the facts of any other
case would be highly prejudicial to the accused.) Id. at par. 76(a) (3) provides
for consideration of prior convictions in arriving at the sentence. (This section
was ruled inapplicable by the law officer because the accused had not been pre-
viously convicted of any offense.)
4. Rehearing on the sentence was ordered because of the prejudice arising from
the assistant trial counsel's pointing out to the court-martial paragraph 33(h) of
the Manual, which states in part that "when any offense charged is not of a
purely military nature, he [the commanding officer of the accused when determin-
ing to what type court-martial to refer the charges for trial] should take into
account the fact that the retention in the armed forces of thieves and persons
guilty of moral turpitude injuriously reflects upon the good name of the military
service and its self-respecting personnel."
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sentence. In the case of special courts-martial an exception was
made to the extent that the president of the court-martial can
make use of the Manual in performing his duties which are
analogous to those of the law officer. United States v. Rinehart,
8 USCMA 402, 24 CMR 212 (1957).5
Pursuant to authority granted by Congress in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 6 the President of the United States pro-
mulgated the Manual for Courts-Martial, which prescribes the
procedure, including the modes of proof, for courts-martial.
However, the Manual itself does not state whether it is to be
used by the members of a court-martial. The question arose as
to what source of law the court-martial was to use. Soon after
it came into existence, the Court of Military Appeals stated that
the primary source of applicable law for members of the court-
martial was the instructions of the law officer in general courts-
martial or those of the president in special courts-martial. 7 The
duty to instruct could not be satisfied by merely referring mem-
bers of the court-martial to pertinent sections of the Manual;
full instructions on the law had to be given.8 However, the Court
5. As an aid to the non-military reader, it might be appropriate to set forth
the system of review provided for the military. When the convening authority has
taken final action on a general court-martial case, he must forward the complete
record to the appropriate Judge Advocate General. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY
JUSTICE, art. 65(a), c. 1041, 70A STAT. 59 (1956), 10 U.S.C. § 865 (Supp. V
1958). A Board of Review is appointed by each Judge Advocate General. This
Board of Review is composed of "not less than three commissioned officers or
civilians" who must be members of a federal or state bar. It is required that the
record of trial of courts-martial in which the sentence, "as approved, affects a
general or flag officer or extends to death, dismissal of a commissioned officer,
cadet, or midshipman, dishonorable or bad-conduct discharge, or confinement for
one year or more" be referred to the Board of Review. Id. art. 66. The final step
in the military judicial hierarchy is the Court of Military Appeals. This court is
composed of three civilian judges appointed 'by the President of the United States.
Review by this court is mandatory in cases wherein the sentence as approved by
the Board of Review affects a general or flag officer, or in case the Board of
Review affirms a death sentence. In all other cases, only the goiernment can
appeal as of right. If the Judge Advocate General of a service deems further
review desirable, he may forward a Board of Review case to the Court of Military
Appeals. Finally, the Court of Military Appeals may grant an appeal upon peti-
tion of the accused "on good cause shown." Id. art. 67.
A final conviction by a court-martial is not subject to review by appeal to a
federal civilian court. However, collateral attack can be made upon the court-
martial conviction. The ordinary form of collateral attack is an application for
writ of habeas corpus. See United States v. Ferguson, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 68, 17 C.M.R.
68 (1954) ; Note, Military Law- Due Process, Review of Courts-Martial on Peti-
tion for Habeas Corpus, 21 GEO. WASH. L. RaV. 492 (1953).
6. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, art. 36, c. 1041, 70A STAT. 50 (1956),
10 U.S.C. 836 (Supp. V, 1958).
7. United States v. Chaput, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 127, 7 C.M.R. 3 (1953) United
States v. Ginn, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 453, 4 C.M.R. 45 (1952).
8. United States v. Baguex, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 306, 8 C.M.R. 106 (1953) United
States v. Richardson, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 88, 6 C.M.R. 88 (1952).
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of Military Appeals saw no reason to criticize the practice of
referring the court-martial members to the Manual for pertinent
amplifying material.9 The Army Board of Review approved the
practice of allowing members of the court-martial to retain pos-
session of the Manual throughout the proceedings. 10 Courts-mar-
tial were reversed only upon a finding that the defendant had
been prejudiced because of the use of the Manual by the court-
martial members." However, in United States v. Boswell,12 de-
cided four months prior to the instant case, the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals disapproved the practice of providing members of
a court-martial with a copy of the Manual for Courts-Martial for
use in closed sessions. In that case the court made the statement
that it was improper for the members of the court-martial to
consult outside legal sources, and that in this respect, the Manual
for Courts-Martial was no different from other legal sources.
In the instant case' 3 the Court of Military Appeals promul-
gated the rule that the prior practice of permitting members of
a court-martial to make use of the Manual for Courts-Martial
during the course of the trial or while deliberating upon the find-
ings or sentence will be prejudicial error, and must be discon-
tinued. The court stated that it would not sanction the practice
of permitting court-martial members to "rummage" through a
work on military law such as the Manual for Courts-Martial,
deciding for itself which of the "myriad" of principles contained
therein should be applied. One reason given was that numerous
9. United States v. Gilbertson, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 465, 4 C.M.R. 57 (1952).
10. In United States v. Phillips, C.M. 353183, 9 C.M.R. 186, 198 (1952), the
Army Board of Review stated that "in enacting the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, the Congress must have known about the long established practice, ex-
pressed throughout the years in the various manuals, under which the members
of courts-martial may use the Manual during their deliberations. By failing to
impose any limitation on this practice, Congress by implication approved it." The
Board of Review added that "it appears unreasonable to assume that the members
of the court would be familiar with the numerous procedural safeguards which
have been set forth in the Manual, without benefit of reference to the Manual
(MCM 1951, pars. 74, 76, pp. 114-118, 121-124)."
In United States v. Moses, C.M. 363294, 14 C.M.R. 278 (1953), the Army
Board of Review considered the refusal of the Court of Military Appeals to criti-
cize the referral to the Manual for amplifying matter after full instructions in the
Gilbertson case, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 465, 4 C.M.R. 57 (1952), as "at least" tacit ap-
proval of use of the Manual by members of the court-martial. See also United
States v. Doyle, A.C.M. 8768, 17 C.M.R. 615 (1954).
11. Further, the Court of Military Appeals, in the case of United States v.
Kunak, 5 U.S.C.M.A. 346, 17 C.M.R. 346 (1954), apparently approved the prac-
tice of allowing members of a court-martial access to the Manual. At this time
the court felt that references to the Manual by the law officer would be of little
assistance to the court-martial members if they were denied access to the Manual.
12. 8 U.S.C.M.A. 145, 23 C.M.R. 369 (1957).
13. United States v. Rinehart, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 402, 24 C.M.R. 212 (1957).
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passages in the Manual had been invalidated by the court, and a
perusal of the Manual might lead to an application of these in-
valid sections.14 Further, the court stated that there was no way
of knowing whether the court-martial applied the law as given
by the law officer or president of the special court-martial, or
rejected it in favor of other material found in the Manual.
The armed forces require all officers to meet prescribed
standards of training relative to the Manual for Courts-Martial,
but the vast majority of the members of courts-martial have had
no formal legal training. 5 For this reason the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals in the instant case was apparently afraid of the
consequences of allowing a work on the law in unskilled hands.
The court recognized that the Manual gives the members of spe-
cial courts-martial the right to object to the rulings made by the
president on interlocutory questions, but felt that allowing mem-
bers to peruse casually the Manual during the court-martial ses-
sions would not aid them in making intelligent objections. Objec-
tions, stated the court, should be made on the basis of the mem-
ber's general knowledge of the law. To support further its hold-
ing in the present case the court resorted to federal and state
court decisions. In the civilian judicial system perusal of law
books by a jury is disapproved and considered as misconduct on
their part. Nevertheless, in most jurisdictions the complainant
is required to show prejudice to his cause as a result of the mis-
conduct before a new trial will be granted. 6 The Court of Mili-
tary Appeals, however, relied upon the cases reflecting the mi-
nority rule that mere use of lawbooks by a jury is prejudicial
error.
17
Some pertinent criticisms of the case were voiced in the dis-
senting opinion. The dissenting judge felt that the law relative
to use of lawbooks by a jury in the civilian system should not
14. For a list of these sections, see FELDI, A MANUAL OF COURTS-31ARTIAL
PRACTICE AND APPEAL, Appendix I, p. 164 (1957).
15. United States v. Rinehart, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 402, 24 C.M.R. 212 (1957) (dis-
senting opinion).
16. For a collection of the cases in civilian jurisdictions, see Annot., 54
A.L.R.2d 710 (1956).
17. It is to be noted that the Court of Military Appeals relied quite heavily.
upon the case of United States v. Gordon, an unreported case of the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals. In that case the court decided that the use of the hand-
book for jurors constituted prejudicial error. However, this decision was later
discarded in another opinion, the court holding that before the complainant will
be given relief, he must present evidence that the jurors had been prejudiced
against him by the reading of the handbook. United States v. Gordon, 253 F.2d
177 (7th Cir. 1958). Accord: Schoultz v. State, 106 So.2d 424 (Fla. 1958)
Ferrara v. State, 101 So.2d 797 (Fla. 1958).
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necessarily be applied to the military. Members of a court-mar-
tial must act somewhat in the capacity of both judge and juror.18
For example, they have authority to overrule law officers and
presidents of special courts-martial on some questions of law, 19
and they must fix the punishment within the limitations set out
in the Manual for Courts-Martial.2 0 Further, an officer assigned
as judge for a summary court-martial must understand and use
the Manual. Officers detailed as counsel for the accused must
familiarize themselves with the provisions of the Manual to pre-
sent a defense adequately. As pointed out in the dissenting
opinion, the gist of the problem is that members of military
courts are familiar with the Manual whereas jurors are not
ordinarily learned in the law. Hence it does not appear that mili-
tary law should be molded in the fashion of civilian law in this
area.
21
The majority felt that intelligent objections by members of a
court-martial to a ruling by the presiding officer must arise
from background knowledge of the law, and not from perusal of
the Manual. Granted that knowledge is a prerequisite to an in-
telligent objection, it would appear that use of the Manual to
refresh the memory and to clarify any misconceptions that a
member might have is far better than sole reliance upon mem-
ory.22 Further, as a ground for its decision in the instant case,
18 ,8 U.S.C.M.A. 402, 24 C.M.R. 212 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
19. The law officer of a general court-martial and the president of a special
court-martial are required to rule upon interlocutory questions, other than chal-
lenges, arising during the trial. Any such ruling by the law officer of a general
court-martial on any interlocutory question other than a motion for a finding of
not guilty, or the question of the accused's sanity, is final and constitutes the ruling
of the court. However, all rulings made by the president of a special court-martial
are subject to objection by any member of the court-martial. In case of such ob-jection, the court is closed and the question voted on by the members of the court-
martial. UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE art. 51(b), c. 1041, 70A Stat. 54
(1956), 10 U.S.C. 851 (Supp. V. 1958).
20. United States v. Boswell, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 145, 23 C.M.R. 369 (1957) (dis-
senting opinion).
21. The majority of the court seems to think that for military law to advance
it must parallel the civilian. system as closely as possible. This may be true, but
the court should not forget the peculiarities of military justice. The court, itself,
has stated what appears to be the most workable solution, as follows: "Absence of
legal forms and authorities, inexperience in the details of legal procedure, and
interference by other military duties . . . must be considered in weighing the bur-
den to be saddled on military lawyers. If, because of the peculiarities of the mili-
tary service, a variation from civilian practice is necessary to assure a fair trial,
we should unhesitatingly adopt the procedure best suited to the administration of
military justice." United States v. Hemp, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 280, 3 C.M.R. 14, 20
(1952).
22. A likely effect of the rule set out in the instant case is that objections will
be considerably reduced in number, for a member of the court-martial will be re-
luctant to voice an objection unless he is absolutely certain that his objection is
[Vol. XlX
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the court pointed to the danger of a lawbook in the hands of a
non-lawyer. Yet the president of a special court-martial, al-
though not generally legally trained, is permitted to use the Man-
ual, as the court itself acknowledged. To this extent, then, the
court's reasoning appears inconsistent, for it struck down the
use of the Manual by non-lawyers, while at the same time direct-
ing one non-lawyer to use it.
It is submitted that the Court of Military Appeals should
have adhered to the pre-existing rule and reversed the court-
martial for use of the Manual only in cases where the defendant
was prejudiced, rather than formulating a rule which divests
the members of the court-martial of an important aid in carry-
ing out their functions.
A Clayton James, Jr.
NATURAL GAS ACT -CHANGES IN RATES UNDER SECTION 4(d)
United Gas Pipeline Company supplies gas to the City of
Memphis' natural gas distribution agency under long term serv-
ice agreements containing the following pricing provision: "All
gas delivered hereunder shall be paid for by Buyer under Seller's
Rate Schedule ... or any effective superseding rate schedules on
file with the Federal Power Commission." After the agreements
had been in effect several years, United, proceeding under Sec-
tion 4 (d) 1 of the Natural Gas Act,2 filed new rate schedules in-
creasing its prices. The Commission ordered a hearing 3 as to
well founded and can cite the applicable section of the Manual to the presiding
officer for support of his position.
1. Section 4(d) provides: "Unless the Commission otherwise orders, no change
shall be made by any natural-gas company in any such [filed] rate, charge, classi-
fication, or service, or in any rule, regulation, or contract relating thereto, except
after thirty days' notice to the Commission and to the public. Such notice shall be
given by filing with the Commission and keeping open for public inspection new
schedules stating plainly the change or changes to be made in the schedule or
schedules then in force and the time when the change or changes will go into
effect. The Commission, for good cause shown, may allow changes to take effect
without requiring the thirty days' notice herein provided for by an order specifying
the changes so to be made and the time when they shall take effect and the man-
ner in which they shall be filed and published."
2. Natural Gas Act of 1938, 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. § 717 (1952).
3. Under Section 4(e) : "Whenever any such new schedule is filed the Com-
mission shall have authority, either upon complaint of any State, municipality, or
State commission, or upon its own initiative without complaint, at once, and if
it so orders, without answer or formal pleading by the natural-gas company, but
upon reasonable notice, to enter upon a hearing concerning the lawfulness of such
rate, charge, classification, or service; and, pending such hearing and the decision
thereon, the Commission, upon filing with such schedules and delivering to the
